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War as Morally Unintelligible:
Sovereign Agency and the Limits of
Kantian Autonomy

Philip J. Rossi
Theology Department, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Abstract: Kant’s treatment of war is usually discussed as part of his political
philosophy or philosophy of history. In contrast, this essay locates these
discussions in direct reference to major elements of his moral philosophy:
autonomy, the categorical imperative, and the moral relationality of the
kingdom of ends. Within this context, Kant’s account of war, particularly in
writings from the 1790s, can be read as affirming war as morally
unintelligible: It is the expression of a collective withdrawal from the
constitutive relationality of moral community. This results in a radical
disparity in the exercise of moral autonomy by the sovereign agency of the
state with respect to peace, on one hand, and with respect to war, on the
other.

I. War: Radical Challenge to Human Relationality
Kant’s discussions of war are most often located in texts that
articulate the framework of his political philosophy1 or sketch elements
of his philosophy of history.2 In consequence, most accounts of his
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thinking about war tend to bypass questions about the location of war
within the basic conceptual taxonomy of his moral philosophy. These
accounts often concentrate instead on questions or topics that place
war as a subject falling within the specific purview of political
philosophy or the philosophy of history. They thus engage questions
such as the extent to which Kant’s discussions align him with the
traditions of just war thinking,3 constitute an element in his theory of
political sovereignty,4 provide a basis for later accounts of an
international cosmopolitan order,5 or enable him to negotiate the
pitfalls of a Hegelian dialectic that would make war morally
instrumental to the achievement of the ultimate ends of human
history.6
Pursuing these questions continues to yield useful results; for
instance, recent work along these lines has drawn attention to Kant’s
initial adumbration of some elements anticipating the articulation of a
set of post bellum conditions that are now often incorporated into just
war theories and to the application of Kant’s discussion to international
interventions in the case of a ‘failed state’.7 My goal in this essay,
however, is not directly to engage these questions or other ones
arising primarily from the contexts of political philosophy and the
philosophy of history, as instructive as those tasks may be. This
essay’s more fundamental concern arises from the fact that questions
such as these (perhaps with the exception of ones similar to that
posed in terms of Hegel’s historical dialectic) seem to presume that
‘war’ functions conceptually in ways that can be unproblematically
located with respect to the key concepts structuring Kant’s moral
philosophy. It is thus taken for granted that there is little need to
provide a detailed moral account or analysis of war itself in terms of
the fundamental conceptual structure of his moral philosophy. On this
presumption, war is taken to be a course of action (or an array of
various courses of action) that, at least in certain circumstances, could
rightly be incorporated into the maxims of autonomous decisions made
by moral agents in accord with the dictates of moral reason.8
Over against such a presumption I will be arguing in this essay
that Kant’s writings, particularly those from the 1790s, provide
substantial indications that war had started to take on a deeply
problematic status in relation to the central concepts of his moral
philosophy. War is no longer just one particularly complex moral issue
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arising from conflicting claims to right that arise between states in the
international arena and within which various courses of actions need to
be weighed with respect to the demands of moral reason. It starts to
become as well a key marker of the deep tensions inextricably
embedded in the moral circumstances of humanity’s efforts to
extirpate its self-incurred propensity to evil, i.e., the propensity to
invert the fundamental maxim for determining one’s action: one
subordinates the maxim that articulates the universally applicable
demands of moral reason to a maxim that serves self-preference and
self-exception in the face of reason’s universal demand. This
problematic status arises to the extent that Kant’s discussions of war
in these later writings indicate that he has begun to consider it as a
social counterpart to the radical evil that, in Religion Within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason, he had articulated as lying deep within the
structure of autonomous moral agency.9 War no longer presents itself
simply as a possible object that can be determined to be fit (or unfit)
for autonomous moral choice; it looms now, instead, as a thoroughly
destructive social expression of the dynamics of the fundamental
moral disorder of self-preference and self-exception that Kant calls
‘radical evil’. The radical evil of war is that it completely undermines
the human relationality and solidarity that, as the locus of elements
formative of a universal moral community, provides the constitutive
context for any and all agents’ exercise of a genuine autonomy of
mutually acknowledged freedom.
On the account I am proposing, the fundamental conceptual
markers delimiting Kant’s account of the moral use of reason—the
autonomy of human moral agency, the categorical imperative as a
demand of the practical use of reason, and the mutual respect that
constitutes the universal moral community of autonomous agents that
he terms ‘the kingdom of ends’—are what provide the basis that
eventually moves his thinking along a trajectory that requires war to
be taken as a form of the moral unintelligibility that lies at the core of
radical evil in both its personal and its social forms. Just as a maxim of
self-preference marks out an individual agent’s withdrawal from the
mutuality of the moral community that provides intelligibility to the
universality of reason’s demand, war marks out a more far-reaching
withdrawal from the constitutive relationality of moral community; it is
a withdrawal that is collective in its scope. In the case of war, its
unintelligibility lies in the depth and extent to which it destabilizes the
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human solidarity and relationality formative of moral community; in
consequence, it stands as a constant threat to undermine both the
possibility and the efficacy of the exercise of autonomous human
agency. The destabilization it effects is such that Kant regards war as
a condition of unqualified lawlessness: it is the violently enacted denial
of the human relationality requisite for the exercise of autonomous
human agency. It is the social expression of a self-preferential maxim
that, in the guise of protecting the rights and well-being of one’s own
civil society, allows, enjoins, and gives social approbation to the
inflicting of deadly violence upon those fellow autonomous agents who,
in a primal denial of human solidarity and relationality, are now
deemed to be ‘enemies’.
Two related texts that are particularly important for an initial
charting of this trajectory in Kant’s thinking can be found in “Perpetual
Peace” and in the “Conclusion” to Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals.
These texts are the ones in which Kant most directly and emphatically
claims the status of a categorical imperative for the maxim ‘there shall
be no war’: [Y]et reason, from the throne of the highest morally
legislative power, delivers an absolute condemnation of war as a
procedure for determining rights and, on the contrary, makes a
condition of peace, which cannot be instituted or assured without a
pact of nations among themselves, a direct duty. (ZeF GS 8:356/ET
327)Now morally practical reason pronounces in us its irresistible veto:
there is to be no war, neither war between you and me in a state nor
war between us as states, which, although they are internally in a
lawful condition, are still externally (in relation to one another) in a
lawless condition; for war is not the way in which everyone should
seek his rights. (MS GS 6: 354/ET 491)
In these texts, the categorical imperative stands out, both
substantively and rhetorically, as the central point of moral reference,
but the two other central Kantian moral concepts, autonomy and
mutual respect, each play a major role in the bold moral claim that I
take him to be advancing here. With regard to the first, inasmuch as
moral reason ‘issues from its throne’ an absolute condemnation of war
incumbent upon all as a direct duty, this prohibition stands as a
categorical imperative for all autonomous agents and its enactment
thus requires the exercise of autonomous human agency. With regard
to the second, the “irresistible veto” against war that morally practical
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reason here pronounces as a categorical imperative bears upon the
relation of respect “between you and me” that is required of all of us
who stand in relation to one another in the “lawful condition” of right
that constitutes the civil community of the state. This categorical
imperative against war does not simply arise in virtue of the respect
we owe one another as members of a kingdom of ends; its full focus in
this instance is upon the affirmation and sustaining of that respect as
the very condition for autonomous moral life. It is not merely a
transgression of law; it is a dismantling of the very framework that
makes law possible.

II. Lawlessness and the Moral Unintelligibility of
War
What I have proposed so far is that, in his latest writings, Kant
characterizes war in ways that suggest that it poses a singular moral
challenge that is far more fundamental than whether there are reasons
and circumstances that morally justify declaring and prosecuting a
specific war. War stands, instead, as a radical challenge to the exercise
of human autonomy inasmuch as it represents a fundamental
undermining of the human relationality that provides autonomy with
its constitutive context. At the same time, as Kant tries to articulate
the nature of this challenge he returns to parts of the conceptual
territory—in particular, the concept of ‘the state of nature’ as
‘lawless’—that he had covered in earlier accounts of the origin of civil
society that form a core element in his political philosophy. In
returning to this territory, however, I do not see Kant significantly
revising that core element with respect to the role it plays in his
political philosophy, least of all with respect to its function in placing
him within the broad tradition of social-contract thinking. Rather than
revising his thinking about the contractual dynamics that structure civil
society, his reconsideration of the moral status of war focuses, instead,
on probing more thoroughly the circumstances and dynamics of the
putative ‘lawlessness’ of such a state of nature with respect to its
fundamental moral conceptuality and intelligibility.
In consequence, an important feature in the trajectory of Kant’s
thought toward affirming the moral unintelligibility of war is his claim
that this categorical imperative prohibiting war has unconditional
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authority for all autonomous agents in even the lawless condition that
constitutes a state of nature. While it remains the case that, as
members of a particular civil society, autonomous agents are no longer
in such a lawless condition with respect to their fellow citizens in that
society, a state of nature continues to constitute the status of
international relations as lawless prior to the establishment of a
cosmopolitan world order that will make enduring peace possible. In
other words, the categorical prohibition against war extends even into
what Kant considers to be the remaining (and internationally
pervasive) field of the lawless circumstances of the state of nature out
of which reason had required the founding of human civil
communities; this extension is required inasmuch as humans
intentionally put themselves back into those lawless circumstances
when, as nations, they contend against one another with deadly force
in an explicitly undertaken state of war. Kant is thus claiming that this
unconditioned law prohibiting war, which reason demands that we all
follow, can and must be discerned by autonomous agents, even when
they place themselves, as they needs must in declaring war and
pursuing war, to be once again in an utterly lawless condition. In this
case, however, the lawless condition marks the absence, not of a civil
order internal to particular nations and their citizens, but of an
international civil society constituted by an order of mutual recognition
and respect among nations. In consequence, this categorical
prohibition of war touches—though now on the macro scale of the
human sociality formed by nation-to-nation relations—upon the very
core of the human mutual relationality whose recognition provides
fundamental form to the moral order constituted by and through
autonomous human agency.
Kant, it should be noted, is quite aware of both the parallels and
the differences that are involved between constituting the internal civil
order for particular nations and constituting an international civil order
among nations. A crucial difference between the two circumstances
that Kant identifies as the state of nature is that in the case of exiting
that condition for the sake of constituting the civic order for the
governance of particular nations, the use of coercion to bring
individual agents into becoming participants in that order is a
necessary and justified limitation upon the exercise of their freedom;
in the case of the international order, however, applying such coercion
upon a sovereign nation cannot be similarly justified.10 What Kant calls
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in “Perpetual Peace” a “federalism of free states” (ZeF GS 8: 354/ET
325) comes about only in virtue of each state entering freely into such
an association and thereby also freely assenting to the adjudicatory
mechanisms that such a federation establishes to settle disputes that,
in the international state of nature, would lead to war. Put in more
direct terms, in entering into such a federation, a state freely
renounces the only ‘right’ it seemed to have in the state of nature, i.e.,
the ‘right to war’ (MS GS 6: 343–46/ET 482–84).11
There is an unmistakable irony, however, in Kant’s account, and
this irony has a direct bearing upon the substance of the claim that I
have been making that in these later writings Kant begins to consider
war morally unintelligible. The irony lies in the fact that the right that a
nation ‘renounces’ in entering a federation of free states is not a right
at all, since, on Kant’s account, there is no basis for any right in a
state of nature—unless one is willing to countenance, in the manner of
Thrasymachus, the advantage of the stronger as the basis for right.
The renunciation in question thus is not primarily an act of foregoing a
basis for action upon which one once legitimately had a claim. It is
rather the recognition that such a right is illusory: no state has ever
had a legitimate basis for such a claim to begin with. In the lawless
condition of the international state of nature, no legitimacy can be
conferred on any claim to have or to exercise a ‘right’. This illusory
character of the right to war can thus be taken as the initial and
perhaps the most fundamental marker of the moral unintelligibility of
war.
The irony of renouncing a right that is not at all a right is further
compounded, moreover, by the problem of identifying the agent (or
agents) upon whom moral reason places the demand for such a
renunciation/recognition and, concomitant with it, the agent (or
agents) whose autonomy enables them to bring a sovereign state into
a federation of free states. Put within the larger context of Kant’s
proposal for a cosmopolitan world order that provides the conditions
for lasting peace among nations, this question of the agency
responsible for the constitution of a cosmopolitan world order brings to
light an unresolved tension between his account of moral autonomy
and his account of political order; this tension bears upon the extent to
which the moral unintelligibility of war, in undermining the relationality
that gives form both to the moral and the political order, thereby also
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undermines the possibility for the exercise of autonomous moral
agency in the political order.
On my reading of the relevant texts, there are at least three
points at which this tension is manifest. The first bears upon the
identification of circumstances under which this categorical imperative
prohibiting war becomes an operative demand upon human moral
agents; the second bears upon the identification of the specific agents
upon whom it is incumbent to act upon this demand; the third point,
finally, bears upon the specification of the concrete actions required to
enact this demand of our moral reason. With respect to each point,
attention to Kant’s account of the thoroughly lawless social
circumstance of the international order of sovereign states within
which human beings, through the agency of those sovereign states, go
to war with one another is crucial: It provides the context from which
Kant places singular responsibility upon the autonomous human
agency of the sovereign, as a ‘moral politician’, for recognizing and
enacting the categorical demand of the moral reason that “there shall
be no war.”
The central feature of that circumstance is that, prior to any
actual declaration of war or any actual hostilities, it is already a state
of war: The elements of the rights of nations are these: 1) states,
considered in their external relation to one another are (like lawless
savages) by nature in a nonrightful condition. This nonrightful
condition is a condition of war (of the right of the stronger) even if it is
not a condition of actual war and actual attacks being constantly made
(hostilities). (MS GS 6: 344/ET 482)
Kant argues that within such a “nonrightful condition” the sole
right that states have is a ‘right to war’, which functions in a tripartite
manner: with respect to initiating war, conducting war, and ending a
war (MS GS 6: 344–50/ET 482–87). As already noted, moreover,
there is a curious character to his discussion of these functions,
however, in that the right in question is fundamentally problematic: It
lacks the fundamental social condition necessary for being exercised as
a right, i.e., the lawful condition of the mutual recognition that, even
as it became constitutive of civil society for individuals leaving the
state of nature, was not extended to the relationship between and
among states. One remark Kant makes in Metaphysics of Morals
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suggests this lack of mutual recognition lies at the basis of the moral
unintelligibility of war: “it is pleonastic, however, to speak of an unjust
enemy in a state of nature; for a state of nature is itself a condition of
injustice. A just enemy would be one that I would be doing wrong by
resisting; but then he would also not be my enemy” (MS GS 6: 349–
50/ET 487).
“Perpetual Peace,” by contrast, does not show similar rhetorical
constraint in affirming the unintelligibility of war. In that text Kant
makes the striking remark that “The concept of the right of nations as
that of the right to go to war is, strictly speaking unintelligible [läβt
sich eigentlich gar nicht denken] (since it is supposed to be a right to
determine what is right not by universally valid external laws limiting
the freedom of each but by unilateral maxims by force)” (ZeF GS 8:
356–57/ET 328). He then reinforces the claim of unintelligibility by
evoking the image with which he opened the essay—the Dutch
innkeeper’s sign that depicts a graveyard as the locus of ‘perpetual
peace’—as the referent for how one might ironically render intelligible
such a right to go to war: “one would have to mean by it that it is
quite right if human beings so disposed destroy one another and thus
find perpetual peace in the vast grave that covers all the horrors of
violence along with their authors” (ZeF GS 8: 357/ET 328).
The most important textual locus for articulating the tensions
facing the exercise of autonomous moral agency in the face of the
moral unintelligibility of war, however, can be found in Kant’s
treatment, in the first part of the Appendix to “Perpetual Peace,” of the
contrast between the ‘moral politician’ and the ‘political moralist’ in the
manner in which they make decisions and wield power in directing
affairs of state (ZeF GS 8: 370–80/ET 338–47). The ‘moral politician’ is
Kant’s designation for the political leader for whom “the concept of
right is the limiting condition for politics,” in contrast to the ‘political
moralist’ who “frames a morals to suit the statesman’s advantage”
(ZeF GS 8: 372/ET 340). At stake in this distinction is the role of the
exercise of moral autonomy, in the robust sense of properly heeding
the demands of practical reason, in relation to the exercise of political
authority and power in the radically lawless context that constitutes
the international state of nature. Kant’s discussion of the difference
between these two forms of leadership and the relationship this
difference has to the major coordinates of his account of the moral use
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of reason will provide the basis for the final section of this essay, which
will seek to articulate the radical character of the challenge that the
moral unintelligibility of war presents to the autonomy of moral agents
who are charged to exercise power and authority in the state.

III. Peace, War, and the Autonomy of Sovereign
Agency
Although Kant does not identify the precise offices in the
governance and administration of the state that he envisions the moral
politician holding, the overall thrust of the arguments in “Perpetual
Peace” that provide the context for this discussion lends plausibility to
taking his discussion of political leadership to be directed to none other
than the sovereign rulers of the nations of Europe. “Perpetual Peace”
can thus be read as a primer for sovereigns providing them with basic
instruction on how to be moral politicians. The likelihood that he has
these rulers in mind as a principal audience for his essays rests, in the
first instance, upon his expressed view that the republican principle of
governance he favors, i.e., separation of legislative, executive, and
judicial powers, in which those who legislate act as representative of
an enfranchised adult male citizenry, functions most properly and
justly under a monarch who wields the sovereign executive power. It
is further supported, moreover, by particular indications in his
argument that the policies most central to instituting an international
regime for enduring peace, which encompass both the ‘Preliminary’
and the ‘Definitive’ articles for perpetual peace, can be effected only
through a freely exercised agency, i.e., the agency of one individual
who holds sovereign power.
Kant’s placing of the locus of executive power in the hands of a
single monarchical agent is, of course, fraught with implications for his
political philosophy, particularly with respect to its relation to the
political agency of the citizenry of the state. That, nonetheless, is not
the primary issue for this discussion. With respect to the question of
the moral unintelligibility of war, the most important aspect of Kant’s
account on which to focus is the character of the moral autonomy that
is exercised by the sovereign as agent of the state both for war and for
peace. By locating the agency of the state in a single agent, the
sovereign, who is capable of acting autonomously in response to the
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demand of practical reason, Kant’s account satisfies a central condition
of possibility that he has laid down for the emergence of an order of
enduring peace: that a state has the capacity for freely leaving the
international state of nature in order to enter a federation of free
states and thus to enact autonomously the demand of the categorical
imperative that there shall be no war. On Kant’s account then, the
state has this capacity for acting with moral freedom (autonomy)—at
least with respect to establishing conditions for peace—precisely in
virtue of the autonomously exercised agency of its sovereign: In this
case the demand of moral reason that there shall be no war calls upon
the moral freedom (autonomy) of the sovereign to be exercised as the
moral freedom (autonomy) of the state.
It may be the case that in terms of the principles of sovereign
authority within Kant’s political philosophy, this exercise of a
sovereign’s moral autonomous agency in matters of state policy may
be unproblematically characterized as also the exercise of the state’s
freedom. At the same time this attribution of both moral agency and a
concomitant freedom of moral autonomy to the state may not be
unproblematic in terms of the more fundamental conceptual
coordinates of Kant’s moral philosophy. As I indicate below in a
concluding consideration on behalf of the claim that Kant’s discussions
of war move along a trajectory that points towards its moral
unintelligibility, there is a radical disparity in the exercise of moral
autonomy with respect to peace, on the one hand, and with respect to
war, on the other.
The disparity is simple and fundamental: The freedom with
which the sovereign and, concomitant with that, the state exercises its
agency with respect to its establishing conditions for peace is a full
exercise of moral autonomy. It is an unqualified response by that
agency to the duty proposed by the categorical imperative that there
shall be no war. Such a response, moreover, provides an instance in
which an autonomous agent’s adoption of the maxim, ‘there shall be
no war’, as a universal law of nature, precisely in the persona of the
sovereign agency of the state, can be understood as paradigmatically
a “lawgiving by which alone a kingdom of ends is possible” (GMS GS
4: 434/ET 84). In this case, the kingdom of ends is given a concrete,
though nonetheless partial, instantiation as fulfilling a necessary
condition for the establishment of a federation of free states that has
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exited the lawless condition of the international state of nature. In
contrast, as will be noted at the conclusion of this section, the exercise
of agency by which a state goes to and conducts war stands as a polar
opposite to such a full exercise of moral autonomy; exercising agency
to go to war stands as an explicit denial of the moral reciprocity, i.e.,
the universal and mutual respect for one another’s freedom in which
members of a kingdom of ends stand to one another, that provides the
necessary context for the exercise of any agent’s autonomy.
Kant is quite clear that enduring peace comes about not by
understanding it as a technical problem that can be resolved on the
basis of a political expediency that seeks empirical harmonization of
competing interests; it comes about instead by engaging it as a moral
problem in which the duty that there shall be no war is recognized as a
categorical imperative: … the principle [i.e., so act that you can will
that your maxim should become a universal law (whatever the end
may be)] of the moral politician, for whom it [perpetual peace] is a
moral problem (problema morale) is far removed from the other
[technical principle of the political moralist] in its procedure for leading
to perpetual peace, which is now wished for not only as a natural good
but also as a condition arising from acknowledgment of duty. (ZeF GS
8: 377/ET 344)
As is the case with the exercise of an individual agent’s
autonomy in heeding the demands of moral reason, the full
instantiation of a kingdom of ends is not accomplished by any single
agent’s exercise of autonomy, but requires the exercise of such
autonomy by all agents.12 Kant engages this issue in a number of his
writings, most notably in Book Three of Religion Within the Boundaries
of Mere Reason. In that text, he articulates its resolution in terms of a
practical (moral) hope that has its focus on the establishment of an
‘ethical commonwealth’ that functions in many respects as a universal
moral counterpart to the cosmopolitan world order that makes
enduring peace among nations possible and for which a federation of
free states is a necessary condition. One striking similarity between
the establishment of such an ethical commonwealth and the
establishment of a federation of free states is that entrance into each—
in contrast to entrance into a civil society—cannot be coerced; it can
only come about through the exercise of an agent’s moral freedom. A
second similarity is that in both instances Kant merely gestures
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towards engaging the question of what makes possible the
convergence of the moral freedom of all autonomous agents that is
required for the achievement of either of these definitive forms of
human moral community. That gesture is an appeal to the hope for
the convergence of the workings of nature and freedom that he takes
to be grounded in moral reason, a hope that provides the content of
his larger critical reconceptualization of the theological doctrine of
providence.
An assessment of Kant’s reconstruction of providence is
important for determining the overall coherence of the account of the
relation between nature and freedom that is central to his critical
philosophy.13 Such an assessment does not, however, directly bear
upon the more immediate purpose of this section, which is to
articulate the disparity between the exercise of moral autonomy on
matters of war and peace as a marker of the moral unintelligibility of
war. As has already been indicated, Kant is quite vigorous in his
affirmation that acknowledgment of the categorical imperative that
there shall be no war requires an agent to exercise moral autonomy,
i.e., to recognize and to act upon it as a maxim for an unconditioned
duty that has its basis in moral reason and is incumbent on all moral
agents. This affirmation is re-enforced in Kant’s discussion of the
difference between the moral politician and the political moralist in
which, as noted in the citation from “Perpetual Peace” two paragraphs
above, he focuses precisely upon the duty to end war and to enter into
an international order for establishing enduring peace as a prime
instance of the fundamental difference between these two ways of
exercising political leadership. Kant’s discussion makes it clear that the
moral politician is the only one who autonomously determines his
course of action in leading the state; the political moralist, on the
other hand, determines his course of action in ways that can be
understood only as instances of heteronomy, i.e., as “subordinating
principles to the end” (ZeF GS 8: 376/ET 376).
In contrast to the clarity with which he endorses the autonomy
by which one is to pursue peace, Kant’s silence is deafening with
respect to the possibility that maxims by which one might justify
engaging in war can be adopted autonomously as the dictates of moral
reason. The possibility that entering into a state of war might be the
subject for the exercise of moral autonomy does not even come under
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consideration. This should not be surprising inasmuch as Kant equates
the state of nature with a paradigmatically lawless condition: it places
human beings at the farthest remove from the conditions of reciprocity
and mutual respect for one another that give autonomy its moral
intelligibility. In this condition the enmity that is war provides the
default form by which humans engage one another; its ‘form’ is the
chaos of a moral unintelligibility in which there is no standard to judge
what is right in our dealings with one another except the successful
exercise of naked power upon another. It is a condition in which the
governing maxim for human conduct can only be: ‘there shall be war.’
Kant notes this when he observes In fact the political moralist can say
that regent and people or nation and nation do each other no wrong
when they attack each other by force or fraud, though they do wrong
generally in that they deny all respect to the concept of right, which
alone could found peace in perpetuity. (ZeF GS 8: 380/ET 346)
It is of no little significance that Kant makes this remark
precisely from the perspective of the heteronomy of the political
moralist. In keeping with the sharply ironic tone that permeates
“Perpetual Peace,” Kant is unsparing in his characterization of political
moralists as agents whose guiding maxims for action are all
heteronomous: they “frame morals to suit the statesman’s advantage”
(ZeF GS 8: 372/ET 340); by “glossing over political principles contrary
to right” they “make improvement impossible and perpetuate, as far
as they can, violations of right” and “they deal in machinations” (ZeF
GS 8: 373/ET 341); they “approach the right of a state and the right
of nations … in a spirit of chicanery” and make use of “sophistical
maxims” (ZeF GS 8: 374/ET 341–42). On Kant’s account, the moral
unintelligibility of war is patently obvious from the heteronomous
perspective of the politics of power that guides or, perhaps more
accurately, misguides the political moralist. Might Kant be proposing as
well that such moral unintelligibility should be at least as patently
obvious to his readers, especially to those sovereigns who have in
their hands the power not just to exercise a specious ‘right’ to engage
in war but also to exercise their moral freedom by heeding the actual
and ever pressing duty to establish peace?
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Footnotes
For instance, with regard to political philosophy, see TP: Über den
Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht
für die Praxis, GS 8: 273–313/ET: “On the Common Saying: That May
Be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice,” trans. Mary J.
Gregor, in Practical Philosophy ed., Mary J. Gregor, The Cambridge
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 275–313, or MS: Die Metaphysik der Sitten,
§§ 53–62, GS 6: 343–55/ET: The Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical
Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, 343–55. Citations to Kant’s works
that are made in the text and notes will be in accord with the following
abbreviations of their German titles, followed by the volume and pages
numbers in GS (Kants Gessamelte Schriften, Ausgabe der Königlichen
Preußichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, [Berlin 1902–]); these are
then followed by the page numbers of English translations (ET) from
the appropriate volume of The Cambridge Edition of the Works of
Immanuel Kant from which the translations used in the text are taken.

1

GMS Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten GS 4. ET: Groundwork of
the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary J. Gregor, in
Practical Philosophy, ed., Mary J. Gregor, The Cambridge
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
TP

Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein,
taugt aber nicht für die Praxis GS 8. ET: “On the Common
Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No
Use in Practice,” trans. Mary J. Gregor, in Practical
Philosophy.

RVG Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft GS 6.
ET: Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, trans.
George Di Giovanni, in Religion and Rational Theology,
ed. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni, The
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
MS

Die Metaphysik der Sitten GS 6. ET: The Metaphysics of Morals,
in Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor.

SF

Der Streit der Fakultäten, Erneuerte Frage: Ob das menschliche
Geschlecht im beständigen Fortschreiten zum Besseren
sei GS 7. ET: The Conflict of the Faculties, Part II, “An
Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race
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Constantly Progressing?” trans. Mary J. Gregor and
Robert Anchor, in Religion and Rational Theology.
ZeF Zum ewigen Frieden GS 8. ET: “Toward Perpetual Peace,” trans.
Mary J. Gregor, in Practical Philosophy.
For instance, with regard to his philosophy of history, see ZeF: Zum ewigen
Frieden GS 8: 341–86/ET “Toward Perpetual Peace,” trans. Mary J.
Gregor in Practical Philosophy, 317–51, or SF: Der Streit der
Fakultäten: Zweiter Abschnitt GS 7: 79–94/ET The Conflict of the
Faculties, Part II, “An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race
Constantly Progressing?” trans. by Mary J. Gregor and Robert Anchor,
in Religion and Rational Theology, 297–309.

2

For an extensive treatment and critique of views that place Kant’s account
within the just war tradition, see Howard Williams, Kant and the End of
War: A Critique of Just War Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan,
2012); a more compact overview of recent discussion of differing
views of Kant’s position in relation to just war thinking can be found in
Thomas Mertens, “Kant and the Just War Tradition,” From Just War to
Modern Peace Ethics, ed. Heinz Gerhard Justenhoven and William A.
Barbieri (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2012), 231–47.

3

See, for instance, Antonio Franceschet, Kant and Liberal Internationalism:
Sovereignty, Justice, and Global Reform (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2002), 43–66.

4

The most extensive recent account of the development and systematic
import of Kant’s cosmopolitanism is Pauline Kleingeld, Kant and
Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); see 44–71 for a
discussion that bears upon the role that international conflict and war
play in the establishment of a cosmopolitan world.

5

A succinct and quite illuminating instance of such a discussion is found in
Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), in his treatment of Kant’s historical
materialism, 244–49 and particularly in the accompanying endnote 19,
291–92. A related perspective placing Kant’s discussions of
international conflict in relation to Nietzsche’s treatment of conflict is
presented in Martine Prange, “Two Cosmopolitan Paradoxes: The
Productive Role of ‘Conflict’ in Kant and Nietzsche’s Cosmopolitan
Theories,” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten
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des XI. Kant-Kongresses 2010, ed. Stefano Bacin, et al. (Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter, 2013) Bd. 4, 816–25.
For an instance of the first, see Brian Orend, “Jus Post Bellum: A Just War
Theory Perspective,” in Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition
From Conflict to Peace, eds. Carsten Stahn, Jann K. Kleffner (The
Hague: T.M.C Asser Press, 2008), 31–52; on p. 34 he observes, “In
my view, historically the first figure to offer us truly deep, systematic
and forward-looking reflections on justice after war was the German
Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)”; for an
instance of the second see George Cavallar and August Reinsch, “Kant,
Intervention and the ‘Failed State’,” Kantian Review 2 (1998), 91–106.

7

8

Inasmuch as ‘war’ is appropriately construed as a social enterprise, the
specific courses of action constitutive of the choice of ‘going to war’ or
of ‘waging war’ can evidently be of different kinds and they can further
be distinguished from each other in terms of the role different agents
play with respect to these courses of action in the overall enterprise of
war. So for the sovereign, the course of action to be considered is
declaring war (and, conversely, agreeing to a peace treaty); for those
in the military, it is preparing for and engaging in combat. Questions
about who are the agents of war turn out to be among the vexing
issues entangled in the larger question of whether—at least for Kant—
war can be made morally intelligible.

For a more detailed treatment of this relationship between war and radical
evil see Philip J. Rossi, SJ, “War: The Social Form of Radical Evil,” Kant
und die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX. Internationalen KantKongresses, Band 4, ed. Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, and
Ralph Schumacher (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 248–56.

9

Three particularly relevant texts can be found in RGV GS 6: 93–100/ET
129–34; ZeF GS 8: 354–57/ET 325–28; and MS GS 6: 350–55/ET
487–92. There is a dispute among Kant interpreters regarding the
extent to which Kant consistently maintains the view that coercion
cannot be employed to bring about such a federation of states; for a
useful overview see Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism, 44–58.

10

There is good evidence that Kant’s own position with respect to the manner
in which states enter, i.e., freely or through coercion, into the
international federation he envisioned changes at various points in the
development of his thinking about the international order. For a brief
overview of these developments, see Kleingeld, Kant and
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Cosmopolitanism, 65–71. The argument put forth in the current essay,
however, is not based on attributing a definitive position to Kant on
this particular matter, but rather on the articulating and taking
seriously the conceptual implications that follow from the claims that
he does put forth in a number of texts that entering such a federation
is something that states do freely.
Cf. GMS GS 4: 438–39/ET 87–88. Kant touches upon this same issue in a
footnote to the first part of the Appendix in “Perpetual Peace,” ZeF GS
8: 375–76/ET 343.

12

For an overview of the issues involved, see Pauline Kleingeld, “Nature or
Providence? On the Theoretical and Moral Importance of Kant’s
Philosophy of History,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 75
(2001), 201–19.
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